Šio straipsnio tikslas – bendrais bruožais aptarti reduktyvizmo raišką šiuolaikinėje analitinėje sąmonės, moralės, veiksmo ir priežastingumo filosofijoje bei įvertinti redukcijos strategijų šiose filosofijos šakose panašumus ir skirtumus. Straipsnyje aptariamos šešios reduktyvizmo strategijos – sąvokų sinonimija paremta redukcija, a posteriori tapatybės tezė, analitinis funkcionalizmas, anomalusis monizmas, analizė pasitelkiant pareities sąvoką, konceptualinė analizė be sąvokų sinonimijos – ir konstatuojama, kad skirtingose filosofijos srityse šios strategijos reiškiasi skirtingai, taip pat yra skirtingai kritikuojamos ir interpretuojamos. Straipsnyje mėginama paaiškinti kai kuriuos šių skirtumų ir daroma (...) išvada, kad šiuolaikinėje analitinėje filosofijoje neperspektyvu kalbėti apie reduktyvizmą apskritai, kaip vieną visas sritis apimantį reiškinį, paremtą visas reduktyvistines koncepcijas vienijančiu reduktyvizmo modeliu, forma ar vizija. (shrink)

Graikiškas tekstas parengtas pagal: Pindar, Vol. 1: Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes (Loeb Classical Library 56); Vol. 2: Nemean Odes, Isthmian Odes, Fragments (Loeb Classical Library 485), edited and translated by William H. Race, Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1997. -/- Iš sen. graikų kalbos vertė filosofinio teksto vertimo seminaro dalyviai: Vytautas Ališauskas, Viktoras Bachmetjevas, Paulius Garbačiauskas, Elzė Sigutė Mikalonytė, Jonas Skarulskis, Julita Slipkauskaitė, Gendvilė Svirskaitė ir Gintarė Vaičiulytė Mokslinis redaktorius Paulius Garbačiauskas.

Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that (...) 'purer' and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed. (shrink)

According to neo-republicans, democracy is morally justified because it is among the prerequisites for freedom as non-domination. The claim that democracy secures freedom as non-domination needs to explain why democratic procedures contribute to non-domination and for whom democracy secures non-domination. This requires an account of why domination is countered by democratic procedures and an account of to whom domination is countered by access to democratic procedures. Neo-republican theory of democracy is based on a detailed discussion of the former but a (...) scant discussion of the latter. We address this lacuna by interpreting the two most influential principles of inclusion, the all-subjected principle and the all-affected principle, in light of neo-republican commitments. The preliminary conclusion is that both principles are able to capture relations of domination between the democratic state and the people controlled by it in the relevant sense. Yet, the state has virtually unlimited powers to control residents, but only limited powers to interfere in the lives of non-residents. Republican aspirations are therefore more in tune with the all-subjected principle according to which only residents in the territory of the state should be granted rights to political participation. (shrink)

Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman and Michael Ridge responded independently. Andrew Sepielli has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for to account for normative certitude. We shall (...) argue that the being for account of normative certitude is vulnerable to many problems shared by other noncognitivist theories. Furthermore, we shall argue that Sepielli’s account has its own problems: His favored normalization procedure for degrees of being for has highly problematic implications. (shrink)

Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution (...) to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude. (shrink)

Logical anti‐exceptionalism is the view that logic is not special, it is continuous with science. This continuity is typically understood in terms of the use of the abductive method in logical theory choice, with logical knowledge resulting from our choice of the theory best accounting for the data. In this paper, we argue for two related claims: (i) that this understanding of the continuity between logic and science faces considerable challenges; and (ii) that such challenges may be avoided by elaborating (...) the continuity of logic with science in terms of the “logic‐as‐models” approach. More specifically, we defend that logical theories should be seen in the lights of the “models‐as‐epistemic‐tools” approach, an approach to the nature of models in empirical science more closely connected with current scientific practice. The result is a version of logical anti‐exceptionalism opening new perspectives for the philosophical understanding of logic. (shrink)

Over the past three decades, the discourse on the mechanistic approach to scientific modelling and explanation has notably sidestepped the topic of simplicity and fit within the process of model selection. This paper aims to rectify this disconnect by delving into the topic of simplicity and fit within the context of mechanistic explanations. More precisely, our primary objective is to address whether simplicity metrics hold any significance within mechanistic explanations. If they do, then our inquiry extends to the suitability of (...) the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and related criteria in determining the optimal balance of fit and simplicity of mechanistic models. As our main claims, we argue that mechanistic models inherently lend themselves to considerations of simplicity, and that the AIC and BIC and related criteria are applicable to some submodels of certain kinds of mechanistic models. However, these criteria and related criteria designed for curve fitting and causal modelling are of little help for a comparative assessment of full mechanistic models, and a fundamentally different approach is needed to make determinations of this kind. (shrink)

"Speculative Realism in Environmental Education and the Philosophy of Education" was a joint research symposium for the networks on Environmental and Sustainability Education (NW 30) and Philosophy of Education (NW 13), held at the European Conference of Education Research (ECER), 25 August, 2023, in Glasgow, Scotland. The symposium aimed to open up discussion on renewed interest in realisms in the field of philosophy, and what that might mean for education research and the field of environmental education research in particular. As (...) backdrop, environmental education harbours strong democratic traditions as well as recognitions of relationships to a world that is composed by more than human positions and desires. The symposium then forms part of an ongoing discussion of how these positions are understood and intermingle in a rapidly changing world. The expectation of the event was to broaden discussion about the voices present in environmental education, human and otherwise, and sharpen engagement with established traditions within the field. In brief, three paper presentations and discussion by Graham Harman probed questions of: (a) the lightness and darkness of the objects of education, (b) who visibly desires which object in/as education, and (c) the risks of literalisms and correlationalisms in, for example, what is alluring to, and pursued by, educators. In other words, what we care about in and as environmental and sustainability education, what is perceived/treated as peculiar, and what is treated as normal and perverse to the realities of education in the Anthropocene, all matter to the work of speculative realism. (shrink)

Systems of paraconsistent logics violate the law of explosion: from contradictory premises not every formula follows. One of the philosophical options for interpreting the contradictions allowed as premises in these cases was put forward recently by Carnielli and Rodrigues, with their epistemic approach to paraconsistent logics. In a nutshell, the plan consists in interpreting the contradictions in epistemic terms, as indicating the presence of non-conclusive evidence for both a proposition and its negation. Truth, in this approach, is consistent and is (...) dealt with by classical logic. In this paper we discuss the fate of the Liar paradox in this picture. While this is a paradox about truth, it cannot be accommodated by the classical part of the approach, due to trivialization problems. On the other hand, the paraconsistent part does not seem fit as well, due to the fact that its intended reading is in terms of non-conclusive evidence, not truth. We discuss the difficulties involved in each case and argue that none of the options seems to accommodate the paradox in a satisfactory manner. (shrink)

In the first two volumes of On What Matters,1 Derek Parfit pursued a conciliatory project in normative ethics, which sought to dissolve the disagreement between the most plausible versions of Kantianism, contractualism and rule consequentialism. Parfit was less conciliatory in his meta-ethics, however. Does Parfit’s conciliatory project in metaethics succeed? We shall begin to address this question in the next section by, first, trying to get a grip on Parfit’s position, which now goes by the name ‘non-realist cognitivism’, and, second, (...) by examining his account of properties, and of normative properties in particular. We shall then examine whether Parfit’s triviality objection is effective against Jackson’s brand of naturalism. Finally, we will ask whether Parfit is right to think that his favoured metaethical view converges with what he thinks are the most plausible forms of naturalism and quasirealism,illustrated by Railton’s view and Gibbard’s view, respectively. (shrink)

Should artificial intelligences ever be included as co-authors of democratic decisions? According to the conventional view in democratic theory, the answer depends on the relationship between the political unit and the entity that is either affected or subjected to its decisions. The relational conditions for inclusion as stipulated by the all-affected and all-subjected principles determine the spatial extension of democratic inclusion. Thus, AI qualifies for democratic inclusion if and only if AI is either affected or subjected to decisions by the (...) political unit in relevant ways. This paper argues that the conventional view is too simple; that it neglects democratic reasons to recognize only agents and/or moral patients as participants in decision-making. The claim defended is that AAP and ASP implicitly affirm requirements for agency and patiency. In ASP, the entity included must be an agent understood either in terms of legal status, capacity to comply with the law or ability to recognize legitimate authority. In AAP, the entity included must be a patient, understood either in terms of capacity for sentience or consciousness. Thus, the idea here is to explore the potential democratic inclusion of artificial intelligences by an updated account of the relevant conditions of agency and patiency that are implicit in democratic theory. Although conceivable that AI is or will be either affected or subjected in relevant ways to decisions made by political units, it is far less clear that AI will ever be agents or patients in the sense required for democratic inclusion. (shrink)

This book discusses the philosophical work of Décio Krause. Non-individuality, as a new metaphysical category, was thought to be strongly supported by quantum mechanics. No one did more to promote this idea than the Brazilian philosopher Décio Krause, whose works on the metaphysics and logic of non-individuality are now widely regarded as part of the consolidated literature on the subject. This volume brings together chapters elaborating on the ideas put forward and defended by Krause, developing them in many different directions, (...) commenting on aspects not completely developed so far, and, more importantly, critically addressing their current formulations and defenses by Krause himself. Given that Krause’s ideas do connect directly and indirectly with a wide array of subjects, such as the philosophy of quantum mechanics, more broadly understood, the philosophy of logic and logical philosophy, non-classical logics, metaphysics, and ontology, this volume contains important material for the research on logic and foundations of science, broadly understood. All the invited contributors have already worked with the ideas developed by Décio (some of them still work with them), being also distinct authors and extremely relevant in their areas of expertise. The volume is aimed at philosophers, including those of physics and quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This article seeks to address the manner in which we should conceptualise the duties of directors in making decisions where fundamental rights are at stake. We first attempt to show that, in making decisions that implicate fundamental rights, directors are required to consider all individuals affected as having an intrinsic dignity. The interests of non-shareholders must thus be addressed in a non-instrumental manner which, we argue, is only compatible with the adoption of a ‘stakeholder’ conception of directors’ duties. Adopting such (...) an approach, however, raises the difficulty of how directors are to balance multiple intrinsically valuable interests. We argue that the doctrine of proportionality—which has been developed in fundamental rights law as a structured enquiry concerning the circumstances in which it is justifiable to limit rights—can be adapted to the domain of corporate decision-making. The proportionality enquiry provides a transparent, structured process of reasoning that can aid corporate decision-making and open up the possibility for reviewing decisions of directors that affect the fundamental rights of individuals. (shrink)

This paper is a continuation of the authors' attempts to deal with the notion of indistinguishability (or indiscernibility) from a logical point of view. Now we introduce a two-sorted first-order modal logic to enable us to deal with objects of two different species. The intended interpretation is that objects of one of the species obey the rules of standard S5, while the objects of the other species obey only the rules of a weaker notion of indiscernibility. Quantum mechanics motivates the (...) development. The basic idea is that in the ‘actual’ world things may be indiscernible but in another accessible world they may be distinguished in some way. That is, indistinguishability needs not be seen as a necessary relation. Contrariwise, things might be distinguished in the ‘actual’ world, but they may be indiscernible in another world. So, while two quantum systems may be entangled in the actual world, in some accessible world, due to a measurement, they can be discerned, and on the other hand, two initially separated quantum systems may enter in a state of superposition, losing their individualities. Two semantics are sketched for our system. The first is constructed within a standard set theory (the ZFC system is assumed at the metamathematics). The second one is constructed within the theory of quasi-sets, which we believe suits better the purposes of our logic and the mathematical treatment of certain situations in quantum mechanics. Some further philosophically related topics are considered. (shrink)

O papel do intelectual ocupa lugar importante no pensamento de Foucault assumindo ao longo do seu percurso um relevo ético-político. Inicialmente Foucault entende que o aparecimento da figura do intelectual específico marca uma nova relação entre teoria e prática, tal transformação decorre de novas configurações de poder que ao modificar todo tecido social politiza o papel do intelectual a partir de sua ocupação específica, condições de vida e trabalho. Posteriormente, com a exigência de pensar uma ontologia da atualidade, Foucault passa (...) inscrever o intelectual como elemento e ator no presente, mostrando, por meio, da analítica do poder como este atua no funcionamento do dispositivo geral de verdade em nossa sociedade. Segundo Foucault a inscrição do intelectual no regime de verdade exige uma reelaboração do seu papel, pois, o dispositivo de produção do verdadeiro procura submeter sua subjetividade fixando-o uma identidade única e imutável. Nesse sentido, para Foucault, o intelectual pode fazer uso de uma atitude crítica diante do quadro de governamentalização do Estado. A crítica não libera o intelectual do poder, mas, abre um campo de possibilidades de resistências. Para Foucault as lutas contemporâneas são batalhas pelo governo da subjetividade. A partir desse diagnóstico interpela-se senão seria o intelectual uma das figuras na qual se apoiou o sujeito da ação pedagógica e o educador nas últimas décadas. Desta maneira, fazer uso de uma atitude crítica permite o educador resistir à constituição dos estados de dominação, essa atitude diz respeito a relações de governo consigo mesmo e com os outros ligando a um só tempo o poder, a verdade e o sujeito. (shrink)

Durante a formação, estudantes são constantemente expostos a estressores que, se persistentes, podem ocasionar a Síndrome de Burnout (SB). Considerando a importância dessa demanda, este estudo teve como objetivo identificar diferenças nas dimensões da SB em relação ao ano e turno em estudantes de Ps..

In this dissertation we present proof systems for several modal logics. These proof systems are based on analytic (or semantic) tableaux. -/- Modal logics are logics for reasoning about possibility, knowledge, beliefs, preferences, and other modalities. Their semantics are almost always based on Saul Kripke’s possible world semantics. In Kripke semantics, models are represented by relational structures or, equivalently, labeled graphs. Syntactic formulas that express statements about knowledge and other modalities are evaluated in terms of such models. -/- This dissertation (...) focuses on modal logics with dynamic operators for public announcements, belief revision, preference upgrades, and so on. These operators are defined in terms of mathematical operations on Kripke models. Thus, for example, a belief revision operator in the syntax would correspond to a belief revision operation on models. -/- The ‘dynamic’ semantics of dynamic modal logics are a clever way of extending languages without compromising on intuitiveness. We present ‘dynamic’ tableau proof systems for these dynamic semantics, with the express aim to make them conceptually simple, easy to use, modular, and extensible. This we do by reflecting the semantics as closely as possible in the components of our tableau system. For instance, dynamic operations on Kripke models have counterpart dynamic relations between tableaux. -/- Soundness, completeness, and decidability are three of the most important properties that a proof system may have. A proof system is sound if and only if any formula for which a proof exists, is true in every model. A proof system is complete if and only if for any formula that is true in all models, a proof exists. A proof system is decidable if and only if any formula can be proved to be a theorem or not a theorem in a finite number of steps. All proof systems in this dissertation are sound, complete, and decidable. -/- Part of our strategy to create modular tableau systems is to delay concerns over decidability until after soundness and completeness have been established. Decidability is attained through the operations of folding and through operations on ‘tableau cascades’, which are graphs of tableaux. -/- Finally, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation of our dynamic tableau system for public announcement logic in the Clojure programming language. (shrink)

According to the general rule explaining apparent authority, if the behaviour of a principal gives reasonable grounds for the third party to think that the principal has appointed the other person to be his agent, contracts concluded by the third party in the principal’s name shall be binding on the principal, notwithstanding the fact that the agent was not authorised by the principal to conclude particular contracts. In the absence of evidence of apparent authority the agent shall have to redress (...) the damage incurred on a third party in cases where the third party was not aware, and was under no obligation to be aware, of circumstances that the person acted in other person’s name without their express authorisation or in excess of their authority. The principal shall be liable for actions of the apparent agent if the following three requirements are proven: words or conduct of the principal caused the impression of authority; third party could reasonably presume the existence of sufficient authority; third party acted in good faith. The third party’s legitimate expectations must be aligned with the principal’s will in order to apply the doctrine of apparent authority efficiently. (shrink)

The recent Lithuanian court practice shows discrepancies in cases dealing with partitioning of common partial divided property. Moreover, no doctrinal research has been concluded on the limits and conditions of the co-owners‘ right to demand that his share should be partitioned from the common partial ownership in Lithuania. Taking into account that proper implementation of co-ownership rights is based on common agreement of co-owners, when no agreement is reached between co-owners regarding the fact and the mode of partitioning, a question (...) arises on what conditions and to what extent the co-owner is free to implement his right to demand partitioning of his share from the common partial ownership. The research on historical developments of the partition law in different European countries shows that the co-owner’s right to partition is based on the idea of pluralistic conception of the modern property law objects. The authors of this article argue that this conception allows the co-owner to enjoy the right to dispose of his share in the common ownership as a separate object of civil turnover at his own volition and without the other co-owner’s consent. However, the right to partition is not absolute and is limited by the rights of the other co-owner to his share of the same property, so the right to partition may be implemented only following the proportionality and interest balance between the co-owners. (shrink)

The author tries to explore several new amendments to the penal code of Lithuania, made by the Law on 2 December 2010. The first amendment concerns article 72 of the Penal code of Lithuania (confiscation of property). Prior to the year 2003, confiscation of property implied the right of the court to confiscate any property in possession of the sentenced person. However the Penal code of 2003 set up a new concept of confiscation: just proceeds of the crime or objects (...) intended to be used in committing a crime should be confiscated. However practice was very poor. New law aimed at boosting practice of confiscation, particularly from third persons, to whom usually the offender transfers property. Previous wording of the law provided for that the property should be confiscated from the third person just in case the person knew or could know that the property that he possesses is from a crime. The law of 2010 added new alternative conditions. (shrink)

Under Article 74 of the Constitution, for gross violation of the Constitution or breach of oath, or if it transpires that a crime has been committed, the President of the Republic may be removed from office under procedure for impeachment proceedings. In the article the content of the constitutional delict is analysed. The President of the Republic may be brought to constitutional responsibility only for the actions which he committed while in office of the President of the Republic. The President (...) of the Republic may be removed from office not for any violation of the Constitution, but only for gross violation thereof. While implementing the powers established to him in the Constitution and laws, the President of the Republic may not breach the oath. Under Article 74 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic may be removed from office “if it transpires that a crime has been committed” – this provision means that the Constitution provides for the right of the Seimas to remove the President of the Republic from office in the absence of a court judgement recognising that the President of the Republic is guilty of commission of a crime. The Constitution commissions only the Constitutional Court to establish the fact of violation of the Constitution – whether there has been a gross violation of the Constitution and breach of oath by actions of the person. The Seimas may not change or question the conclusion of the Constitutional Court. On the grounds of the conclusion of the Constitutional Court that the actions of the President of the Republic are in conflict with the Constitution, it is only the Seimas that decides whether to remove the President of the Republic from office. The removal of the President of the Republic from office under procedure of impeachment proceedings due to a suspicion that the crime has been committed is not binding upon a court of general jurisdiction which considers the criminal case. (shrink)

The article deals with the doctrine of the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic formulated in the Constitutional Court ruling of 10 January 1998. Attention is focused on the arguments of the Constitutional Court upon which this doctrine is based–these are the arguments regarding the expression of no-confidence in the Prime Minister and the new empowerment of the Government (after more than a half of the ministers are changed). In the (...) opinion of the author, some of such arguments are subject to discussion. The constitutional regulation regarding the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic is inexhaustive and unclear. Although the wording of the provisions of the Constitution regarding the returning of the powers of the Government after the elections of the Seimas and after the elections of the President of the Republic is almost the same, there is one essential difference: the Constitution provides that after the elections of the Seimas the Government must return its powers to the President of the Republic and must resign, whereas the Constitution does not provide that the Government must resign after the elections of the President of the Republic as well. (shrink)

Contextualism about vagueness (hereafter ‘Contextualism’) is the view that vagueness consists in a particular species of context-sensitivity and that properly accommodating this fact into our semantic theory will yield a plausible solution to the sorites paradox.[1],[2] But Contextualism, as many commentators have noted, faces the following immediate objection: if we hold the context fixed, vagueness still remains, therefore vagueness is not a species of context-sensitivity. Call this ‘the simple objection’.[3] Absent a convincing reply to the simple objection, Contextualism is in (...) very bad shape. Oddly enough, defenders of Contextualism have said very little in reply. Proponents of the objection have tended to assume that this is because no reply is in the offing—the simple objection is taken to be unassailable. In this short paper, we sketch two replies to the simple objection which result in two very different kinds of Contextualism: Epistemicist Contextualism and Radical Contextualism. With these two theories in hand, the simple objection loses its force. (shrink)

Is the procreation asymmetry intuitively supported? According to a recent article in this journal, an experimental study suggests the opposite. Dean Spears (2020) claims that nearly three-quarters of participants report that there is a reason to create a person just because that person’s life would be happy. In reply, I argue that various confounding factors render the study internally invalid. More generally, I show how one might come to adopt the procreation asymmetry for the wrong reasons by misinterpreting one’s intuitions.

WHEN MAN FIRST BEGAN to interpret the nature of things—and this he did when he began to be man—life was to him everywhere, and being the same as being alive. Animism was the widespread expression of this stage, "hylozoism" one of its later conceptual forms. Soul flooded the whole of existence and encountered itself in all things. Bare matter, that is, truly inanimate, "dead" matter, was yet to be discovered—as indeed its concept, so familiar to us, is anything but obvious. (...) That the world is alive is really the most natural view, and largely supported by prima facie evi dence. On the terrestrial scene, in which experience is reared and contained, life abounds and occupies the whole foreground exposed to man's immediate view. The proportion of manifestly lifeless matter encountered in this primordial field is small, since most of what we now know to be inanimate is so intimately intertwined with the dynamics of life that it seems to share its nature. Earth, wind, and water—begetting, teeming, nurturing, destroying—are anything but models of "mere matter." Thus primitive panpsychism, in addition to answering powerful needs of the soul, was justified by rules of inference and verification within the available range of experience, continually confirmed as it was by the actual preponderance of life in the horizon of its earthly home. Indeed not before the Copernican revolution widened this horizon into the vastness of cosmic space was the proportional place of life in the scheme of things sufficiently dwarfed so that it became possible to disregard it for most of what henceforth was to be the content of the term "nature." But to early man, standing on his earth arched by the dome of its sky, it could never occur that life might be a side-issue in the universe, and not its pervading rule. His panvitalism was a perspective truth which only a change of perspective could eventually displace. Unquestioned and convincing at the beginning stands the experience of the omnipresence of life. (shrink)

In this paper we deal with two applications of the square of opposition to controversial issues in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The first one concerns the kind of opposition represented by states in superposition. A superposition of “spin up” and “spin down” for a given spatial direction, for instance, is sometimes said to originate particular kinds of opposition such as contradictoriness. The second application concerns the problem of identical particles. Identity and indiscernibility are entangled in discussions of this problem (...) in such a way that a proper conceptual treatment of those issues through the square seems profitable. (shrink)